CHAPTER V✦

THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS

We may feel disinterested resentment, or disinterested retributive kindly emotion, on account of an injury inflicted, or a benefit conferred, upon another person with whose pain, or pleasure, we sympathise, and in whose welfare we take a kindly interest, p. 108.--Sympathetic feelings based on association, p. 109 sq.--Only when aided by the altruistic sentiment sympathy induces us to take a kindly interest in the feelings of our neighbours, and tends to produce disinterested retributive emotions, p. 110 sq.--Sympathetic resentment to be found in all animal species which possess altruistic sentiments, p. 111 sq.--Sympathetic resentment among savages, p. 113 sq.--Sympathetic resentment may not only be a reaction against sympathetic pain, but may be directly produced by the cognition of the signs of anger (punishment, language, &c.), pp. 114-116.--Disinterested antipathies, p. 116 sq.--Sympathy springing from an altruistic sentiment may also produce disinterested kindly emotion, p. 117.--Disinterested likings, ibid.--Why disinterestedness, apparent impartiality, and the flavour of generality have become characteristics by which so-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive emotions, p. 117 sq.--Custom not only a public habit, but a rule of conduct, p. 118.--Custom conceived of as a moral rule, p. 118 sq.--In early society customs the only moral rules ever thought of, p. 119.--The characteristics of moral indignation to be sought for in its connection with custom, p. 120.--Custom characterised by generality, disinterestedness, and apparent impartiality, p. 120 sq.--Public indignation lies at the bottom of custom as a moral rule, p. 121 sq.--As public indignation is the prototype of moral disapproval, so public approval is the prototype of moral approval, p. 122.--Moral disapproval and approval have not always remained inseparably connected with the feelings of any special society, p. 122 sq.--Yet they remain to the last public emotions if not in reality, then as an ideal, p. 123.--Refutation of the opinion that the original form of the moral consciousness has been the individual's own conscience, p. 123 sq.--The antiquity of moral resentment, p. 124.--The supposition that remorse is unknown among the lower races contradicted by facts, p. 124 sq.--Criticism of Lord Avebury's statement that modern savages seem to be almost entirely wanting in moral feeling, pp. 125-129.--The antiquity of moral approval, p. 129 sq.

{x} CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS

Our analysis to be concerned with moral concepts formed by the civilised mind, p. 131.--Moral concepts among the lower races, pp. 131-133.--Language a rough generaliser, p. 133.--Analysis of the concepts bad, vice, and wrong, p. 134.--Of ought and duty, pp. 134-137.--Of right, as an adjective, pp. 137-139.--Of right, as a substantive, p. 139 sq.--Of the relations between rights and duties, p. 140 sq.--Of injustice and justice, pp. 141-145.--Of good, pp. 145-147.--Of virtue, pp. 147-149.--Of the relation between virtue and duty, p. 149 sq.--Of merit, p. 150 sq.--Of the relation between merit and duty, p. 151 sq.--The question of the super-obligatory, pp. 152-154.--The question of the morally indifferent, pp. 154-157.